There is more to economic policy than bank regulation, which so often (like other regulation) amounts to closing the stable door after the horses have bolted. We must not forget the traditional aim of providing a framework for economic growth with low inflation. The main instrument for achieving this has been inflation targets pursued by semi-independent central banks by means of a very short-term official interest rate. As Robin Pringle, the editor of Central Banking, remarks in the latest issue of that journal: “The current dominant framework of monetary policy may not survive its association with the crisis, and perhaps does not deserve to.” There is every sign that many central banks want to cling leech-like to this failed framework. Yet I doubt if they will be able to avoid a rethink.
經(jīng)濟政策不僅僅是銀行監(jiān)管。與其它監(jiān)管一樣，銀行監(jiān)管往往是亡羊補牢。我們不能忘記經(jīng)濟政策的傳統(tǒng)目標：為低通脹的經(jīng)濟增長提供框架。實現(xiàn)這一目標的主要工具，是半獨立的央行通過非常短期的官方利率所追求的通脹目標。正如在最新一期Central Banking中，該雜志的編輯羅賓?普林歌(Robin Pringle)所言：“當前主要的貨幣政策框架或許與危機脫不了干系，可能本來就是如此。”種種跡象表明，許多央行都希望緊緊抓住這個失靈的框架不放。然而，我懷疑他們是否能夠不需要反思。