如果石油價格長期停留在每桶70美元，它會讓亞洲高速增長的經濟一頭栽倒在地，并結束很多亞洲國家過去5年高增長低通脹的好時光嗎？要回答這個問題，有必要先提出另一個問題：2002年初以來的油價急劇上漲，迄今為何對該地區影響如此之??？

Will a prolonged spell of $70-a-barrel oil bring Asia’s high-flying economies crashing to earth and end the heady growth and low inflation in which many have basked for the past five years? To answer that question it is necessary first to pose another: why has the steep rise in oil prices since early 2002 had so little impact on the region so far?

乍一看，亞洲的適應能力令人困惑。頭兩次石油危機帶來的效率和節能措施，幫助西方經濟體經受這一次油價高漲的沖擊，但日本、香港和新加坡以外的亞洲大部分地區，仍在大量消耗石油。印度尼西亞每單位經濟產出的石油消耗，幾乎5倍于工業國家的平均水平，即使是發達得多的韓國，其消耗的石油也是工業國家平均水平的2倍。

At first glance, Asia’s resilience is puzzling. Efficiency and conservation measures prompted by the first two oil shocks have helped western economies weather this one. But most of Asia – apart from Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore – still guzzles oil. Indonesia consumes almost four times more per unit of economic output than the average industrialised country. Even much more advanced South Korea requires twice as much.

直到現在，很多亞洲經濟體一直受到人為保護，未承受高油價的全面沖擊。補貼、價格控制和低燃油稅，阻止了高油價轉嫁到消費者身上。在沒有采取此類措施的國家，高油價的通脹影響被中國主導的制成品競爭抵消，使各國央行得以保持低利率和寬松的貨幣政策。

Until now, many Asian economies have been shielded from the full impact of high oil prices. Subsidies, price controls and low fuel taxes have kept them from feeding through to consumers. In countries that have not resorted to such measures, the inflationary effects of dearer oil have been offset by Chinese-led competition in manufactured goods, allowing central banks to keep interest rates low and monetary policies loose.

與此同時，充裕的全球流動資金，以及投資者對回報的狂熱追求，使得有經常賬戶赤字的國家能夠通過投資組合資本的流入，為更昂貴的石油進口融資。而在經常賬戶有盈余的國家，高儲蓄率減輕了能源和大宗商品價格上升造成的貿易條件惡化帶來的沖擊。

Meanwhile, abundant global liquidity and investors’ frenzied quest for returns have enabled countries with current account deficits to finance dearer oil imports through inflows of portfolio capital. In surplus countries, high savings ratios have softened the impact of the deterioration in the terms of trade caused by higher energy and commodities prices.

薄弱的市場紀律和價格信號抬高了石油消費，讓人沒有動力提高使用效率。這種螺旋上升是無法持續的，在某個時候，盛宴必將結束。不清楚的是，結束的時間是在油價達到每桶70美元，80美元，還是100美元時，但在亞洲較為脆弱的經濟體中，裂縫正開始出現。

Weak market disciplines and price signals have driven up oil consumption and stunted incentives to increase efficiency. The upward spiral is unsustainable. At some point, the party has to end. Whether that point is reached at $70, $80 or $100 per barrel is unclear. But cracks are starting to appear in Asia’s more vulnerable economies.

極度依賴石油進口的泰國已付出代價。由于財政負擔日益加大，貿易赤字不斷攀升，泰國被迫取消了去年出臺的不明智的燃油補貼，這進一步抑制了需求，而泰國經濟本已受到干旱、海嘯和旅游業收入降低的沉重打擊。

Thailand, which depends exceptionally heavily on oil imports, has already paid the price. A growing fiscal burden and mounting trade deficit have forced it to scrap the fuel subsidies it unwisely introduced last year, further depressing demand in an economy battered by drought, tsunamis and lower tourism revenue.

在印尼，補貼吞噬了高達三分之一的預算，政府在取消補貼的問題上猶豫不決，使得印尼喪失了急需的基礎設施投資的資源。在印度，油價控制正使本已龐大的預算和經常賬戶赤字進一步膨脹。補貼大戶中國已被迫限制成品油出口，以應對突然爆發的汽油短缺。

In Indonesia, where subsidies devour as much as a third of the budget, government dithering over scrapping them is depriving the country of resources for desperately needed infrastructure investment. In India, oil price controls are bloating already large budget and current account deficits. And China, also a heavy subsidiser, has been forced to limit exports of refined oil in an effort to combat sudden petrol shortages.

簡而言之，高油價正在暴露曾被繁榮所掩蓋的糟糕的政策和結構性缺陷，正如該地區1997年經濟危機所暴露的那些缺陷。各國的經濟增長率幾乎都將受到影響(石油出口國馬來西亞可能例外)，但那些經濟管理糟糕的國家將面臨最艱難的調整。

In short, high oil prices are exposing bad policies and structural weaknesses that were masked during the boom years – just as the region’s economic crisis did in 1997. Although growth rates almost everywhere will be dented – except possibly in oil-exporting Malaysia – countries with poor economic management face the toughest adjustment.

后果可能不會像1997年的危機那么嚴重，即使每桶70美元的石油，預計也不會讓亞洲經濟陷入衰退。多數亞洲國家的財務狀況都比8年前健康得多，高估的固定匯率已被拋棄，銀行系統進行了改革，短期外債大幅減少，而且多數國家都實行了更嚴格的預算紀律。

The consequences are unlikely to be as severe as those of the 1997 crisis. Even $70 oil is not expected to plunge Asian economies into recession. Most are in much sounder financial shape than eight years ago. Overvalued fixed exchange rates have been abandoned, banking systems overhauled, short-term foreign debt cut drastically and, in most cases, tighter budget disciplines imposed.

但隨著危機后的復蘇步伐加快，自滿現象出現了。該地區不但浪費了能源，還停止了提高經濟效率、減少過度依賴出口導向型增長的努力。雖然部分國家政府試圖刺激國內需求，但大部分國家都在深層次結構改革面前停滯不前，而它們需要這些改革來清除市場扭曲，讓市場更具活力和彈性。

However, as the post-crisis recovery gathered pace, it induced complacency. Not only has the region squandered energy, efforts to increase economic efficiency and reduce heavy dependence on export-led growth have stalled. Although some governments have sought to stimulate domestic demand, most have balked at the deep structural reforms needed to remove distortions and make markets more dynamic and flexible.

或許高油價的沖擊將激發改革。但亞洲各國政府的回旋余地，將由兩個它們無法控制的因素決定：一是美國的貨幣政策走向，卡特里娜(Katrina)颶風造成的破壞和油價飆升，使得美國貨幣政策的前景很不明朗。

Perhaps the jolt of high oil prices will kick-start reforms. However, governments’ room for manoeuvre will be determined by two factors beyond their control. One is the future course of US monetary policy, which has been made much less clear by the devastation and spike in oil prices created by Hurricane Katrina.

二是美國的經濟狀況。卡特里娜颶風導致很多經濟學家調低了對近期經濟增長的預測。還有一個更大的擔憂是，美國的房產泡沫會破滅，引起美國消費者大幅削減支出。鑒于亞洲其它國家嚴重依賴對中國的出口，而中國的大部分增長依賴對美出口，因此沖擊波將傳遍整個地區。正如摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)首席經濟學家史蒂芬?羅奇(Stephen Roach)近期所指出的，全球化是把雙刃劍：它在經濟景氣時廣泛傳播好處，但也會把沖擊迅速傳遍全球。

The second is the state of the US economy. Katrina has caused many economists to trim their near-term growth forecasts. A still bigger concern is that the US housing bubble will burst, causing American consumers to cut spending sharply. Given the rest of Asia’s heavy dependence on exports to China, which in turn relies for much of its growth on exports to the US, the shockwaves would spread throughout the region. As Stephen Roach, Morgan Stanley’s chief economist, recalled recently, globalisation works both ways: it spreads benefits widely in good times but it also transmits shocks rapidly around the world.

我們只能猜測這樣一個惡性循環的發生概率。但目前亞洲經濟前景的不確定性，比1997年危機以來的任何時候都更多、更大。就在各國政府和市場5年來似乎逐漸遺忘風險之際，風險卻在悄悄逼近。

The probability of such a vicious circle developing can only be guessed at. But Asia’s economic prospects are today clouded by more and greater uncertainties than at any time since its 1997 crisis. After five years in which governments and markets seemed increasingly oblivious to risk, it is stalking the region again.

譯者/李功文