Death notices for the surge in globalisation that started in the 1990s have been posted for about as long as the process itself. Covid-19, the US-China conflict, climate change and the struggle for green industrial supremacy are all being offered as reasons for globalisation coming to a stop. And yet it moves.

Now, it’s true that the era of “hyperglobalisation” from roughly 1992 to 2008, where trade grew markedly faster than global gross domestic product, is over — a shift very well described in this new paper from Arvind Subramanian, Martin Kessler and Emanuele Properzi.

Yet on close examination it appears some of the positive parts of globalisation have either slowed naturally or are still in train, and what has gone into reverse wasn’t much of a loss. There are some serious challenges ahead in navigating macroeconomic shocks, particularly in China, and always the risk that geopolitical tensions will escalate rapidly. But only those who fetishise the internationalisation of an ever-larger share of activity in every conceivable economic sector need worry much about what’s happened so far.