Asian policymakers are entitled to look askance at foreign bondholders. Those countries most badly affected by panicked selling 13 years ago learned harsh lessons in leverage, several of them under the tutelage of the International Monetary Fund. Those that avoided a visit from the IMF, such as largely internally-funded India, saw their escape as validation of a more insular approach.

In spite of those reservations, governments should now consider giving a little ground. In some instances, an aversion to debt is retarding growth. Take Indonesia, subject to a huge public and private-sector deleveraging since the late 90s, where successive administrations have acknowledged the need to upgrade the country’s creaking infrastructure. Yet Jakarta continues to finance projects through tax revenues, rather than inviting overseas bond funds to chip in. Emerging Asia as a whole, representing a quarter of the world’s gross domestic product, has less than 8 per cent of its outstanding bonds.

Developing deeper, more liquid bond markets will take time; in India and China, it will also involve relaxing strict quotas for foreigners. But anyone doubting that it makes sense should look to Korea, Asia’s biggest local-currency bond market as a percentage of GDP. The sharp post-Lehman slump in the won could have been a lot sharper had flows out of equities not re-directed into bonds, as they did.